Exhibit C

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                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 2
                  NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 3
   Before The Honorable Virginia K. DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge
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 5
  TAYLOR, et al.,
 6
             Plaintiffs,
 7
   vs.
                                    Case No. C 20-07956-VKD
  GOOGLE, LLC,
 9
             Defendant.
10
                                  San Jose, California
11
                                  Tuesday, August 19, 2025
12
    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND
           RECORDING 10:02 - 12:54 = 2 HOURS 52 MINUTES
13
14
   APPEARANCES:
15 For Plaintiffs:
                                  Bartlit Beck, LLP
16
                                  1801 Wewatta Street
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17
                                  Denver, Colorado 80202
                             BY: KARMA M. GIULIANELLI, ESQ.
18
                             BY: GLEN E. SUMMERS, ESQ.
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                                  Korein Tillery, LLC
                                  205 North Michigan Avenue
20
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21
                             BY: MARC A. WALLENSTEIN, ESQ.
22
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                (APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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 1 motion for class certification and a Daubert motion.
2 between the two, we would like to focus on the motion for
  class certification today and use our time there. Ms.
  Giulianelli will be handling that, but I just wanted to make
  that clear. That's the one we think is priority for the
 6
  day.
 7
             THE COURT: Okay. And how did the Defendants
  think you should proceed?
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            MR. SOMVICHIAN: Your Honor, I agree we should
10 focus on the class certification issues. The Daubert issues
11 are -- are also important. We'll take our cues as to when
12 and -- and how you want to address those, but I agree the
  class certification motion is probably the right place to
14 start.
15
             THE COURT: That was my sense as well, although it
16 seemed to me like there may be some <u>Daubert</u> issues that --
17
            MR. SOMVICHIAN: Yes.
18
             THE COURT: -- overlap with some of the questions
19 that are presented. So, before we get that -- to that
20 issue, nobody asked for this hearing to be conducted under
21
  seal. I have not dug into your extremely large omnibus
22 motion to seal papers.
23
       Are there massive disagreements about what should and
24 should not be sealed for purposes of the class cert briefing
25 and the <u>Daubert</u> briefing?
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39 1 interrupt me and tell me to move on if I don't need to, but 2 for class certification, I think the key point is that everything is going to be shown with common evidence, and that includes all of the elements of conversion. 5 includes consent and implied consent. Class -- conversion cases are routinely certified for class treatment. We cite them, McClure, Wycart (phonetic), in our brief, and those are cases where consent was disputed, and cases involving 9 issues of consent, including implied consent, are also 10 routinely certified in nonconversion cases as well, the 11 Frasco v. F<u>lo Health</u> case in the Northern District of 12 California. And, of course, the reason -- and I think your 13 Honor touched on this -- is because implied and express |14| consent are both judged by the objective reasonable person 15 standard. And, so, Judge Donato said you apply that 16 standard, and that is what you look at in -- in arguing 17 looking at issues of consent on a class-wide basis. 18 And, so, you know, Google's arguments that there are 19 different versions of software, different settings and 20 different cellular data plans fail, of course. 21 transfers all come from GmsCore. They all have certain 22 defining objective characterizations, and none of the 23 settings disclose the transfers or how they happen over 24 cellular, how often they happen or what they are. Therefore, they don't give all the material facts to any

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            MS. GIULIANELLI: But that is correct.
 2
             THE COURT: I understand that that's -- that's the
 3
  theory. So, okay. So -- so, then your -- your -- the way I
  understand your argument then is that the project is to
 5 value that but the -- the factual basis for coming up with
  value uses -- maybe subset isn't the right word but uses
  only the data that is identified as metered to do the
  valuation?
 9
            MS. GIULIANELLI: That is correct. And I think it
|10| -- that is correct because unmetered includes WiFi and --
11 and some of the new 5G plans. So, it's a conservative
12 damages calculation.
13
             THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think -- I think
14 I get that.
15
            MS. GIULIANELLI: But I see why that's confusing.
16
             THE COURT: Yes.
                             Okay. So, this gets in a little
17 bit to the Daubert issue I think, and I'm just going to ask
18 this question out loud. The -- the thing that I found most
19 compelling about Google's argument on the Daubert damages is
20 that the Plaintiffs' experts don't seem to be valuing the it
21 that you have described to me as the converted data.
22 are valuing other things, bigger things, broader things.
23 But I want to make sure that I really understand the
24 Plaintiffs' argument. So, in other words, the marginal data
25 theory really resonated with me, that you should be trying
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54 1 that opinion. There's an active market. We have pricing 2 data. Doctor Gos, on the other hand, argues that we should look at the secondary market and wonder, ask the hypothetical how much would a consumer charge Google. 5 Doctor Etner responds to that and says, We don't -- that there is no active market there. We don't have data, and I think it's a battle of the experts, and it's for the jury to determine, and there's evidence going both ways. But I -- I 9 don't think --10 THE COURT: See, I'm troubled by that because --11 for two -- two reasons. First of all, the damages model has 12 to match the liability theory. So, if the liability theory 13 is one thing, then the damages model has to value that. 14 And, secondly, the case law says there doesn't have to be an 15 actual market. What we are trying to do is use the 16 information that we have to say in the hypothetical world 17 what would be the fair market value of this thing, but you 18 can't say, Well, there's no market for that thing. 19 Therefore, we're going to value some other thing which has 20 not matched your liability theory. And that's where I 21 really struggled, because it seems to me like there is 22 evidence in the world from which experts could necessarily 23 agree but could infer the value of the thing that is 24 actually converted. And, so -- so, I was -- I was troubled 25 by the idea that, well, we're going to value something else.

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 1 marginal value was an important distinction over what your
 2 expert's methodology was, and I was worried about that
 3 because your expert seems to be valuing something other than
  what is converted.
 5
            MR. SUMMERS: On that, your Honor, I would
  disagree. Look, we calculate the precise amount of cellular
  data being consumed by Google for the challenged transfer,
  and they track this. Every single transfer is actually
 9 tagged and tracked, whether it's metered --
10
             THE COURT: Got it.
11
            MR. SUMMERS: We -- we calculate the exact quantum
12 that Google has converted for its own purposes, and our
13 experts then determine the market value, the fair market
14 value of that data using the industry accepted methodology
15 that the industry uses.
16
             THE COURT: What's the industry accepted
17 methodology that you're referring to?
18
            MR. SUMMERS: Doctor Etner's average --
19
            THE COURT: Total revenue divided by total data
20 usage?
21
            MR. SUMMERS: It's -- essentially, yes, that is
22 the -- that is the model that Doctor Etner uses. Every two
23 years, he prepares a report for the cellular
24 telecommunications industry association with all the
25 carriers and Google members. They then utilize this data
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1 the schedule. And I think the circumstances here warrant
 2
  it.
 3
       Just a couple other things. I know the Court doesn't
 4
  want to hear about the Chupo case, but --
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             THE COURT: Well --
 6
            MR. SOMVICHIAN: -- the very same arguments
  presented here were teed up for the Chupo court twice, in
8 2023 and just recently we provided the most recent decision,
9 but --
10
             THE COURT: Okay. Let me just pause you there
11 because -- let me just sort of say a thing about Chupo,
12 which, okay, if somebody gave evidence in Chupo, you know,
13 so it's like prior testimony, fair game, right. Fair game
14 in our case, in our trial, whatever. The fact that there
15 was a decision on some objection, motion, whatever, in
16 Chupo, unless it's binding on me, you know, maybe it has
17 some persuasive value, but I'm not inclined to allow a bunch
18 of supplemental briefing on that. So, I really -- no. That
19 just -- no. We already have piles of material.
       So, I just wanted to share with you guys that's my
21 reaction is obviously if somebody made an admission in the
22 trial, totally fair game here. But unless and until you
23 tell me that some judge in the State Court system has made a
24 binding decision, and I would be delighted to hear that --
25 then I just -- don't expend your time on it.
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129 1 MR. SUMMERS: On the -- that issue, two things, 2 your Honor. I'm -- and I'm not arguing for the supplemental 3 briefs right now. I was just --4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. SUMMERS: -- pointing out that we did submit the Chupo Court's initial decision denying -- basically carbon copies of the Daubert motions here was submitted as 8 Exhibit 6 to their declaration, and we just submitted overnight the more recent decision that you then rejected their -- I mean, that's -- I mean carbon copy, verbatim the 11 same motion. 12 THE COURT: I -- I know, but I'm not going to turn 13 this into a sort of parallel proceeding on your post-trial 14 motions in Chupo. I'm just not going to do that. So, I 15 just --16 MR. SUMMERS: Understood. One other thing, your 17 Honor. Just to advise the Court, I do think that we will be 18 making a motion for collateral estoppel, and but we will do 19 so on or before the schedule for summary judgment. 20 case is all fours with Chupo. The case was tried. 21 was a special verdict form. All the issues were decided 22 from whether this was property to the -- to the way to 23 calculate damages. And the jury adopted Doctor Etner's 24 average price methodology awarding damages, you know, that 25 -- that reflected an adoption or finding of conversion as to

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1 all four of the categories that we're going to be presenting
2 in this case, the exact quantity of data that we provided to
  them, and his average industry price.
 4
       So, we do anticipate doing that. The -- the response
 5
  we anticipate is that collateral estoppel will not be fully
  applicable until there's an appeal.
 7
             THE COURT: Well, don't you just need a judgment?
  Has judgment been entered?
 9
             MR. SUMMERS: A judgment has been entered.
10
             THE COURT: Okay.
11
            MR. SUMMERS: As of July 11th, and it reflects the
12 jury's verdict. Post-trial briefing will be concluded and
  decided by November. But -- but --
14
             THE COURT: Okay.
15
            MR. SUMMERS: -- we will be making a motion for
16 collateral estoppel, which might necessitate a stay for the
17 appeal because under California law, the decision is not
18 fully binding for collateral estoppel purposes at least
19 until the appeal through the California Court of Appeal has
20 been decided.
21
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, that -- that's helpful to
22 know that that request may be coming. I mean, from my very
23 very selfish point of view, I'd rather not do a lot of work
24 on something that is not going to matter because there are
  other events that will have or have already overtaken what
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

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I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above pages of 5 the official electronic sound recording provided to me by the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, of the proceedings taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, 10 related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action 11 in which this hearing was taken; and, further, that I am not 12 financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the 13 action.

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Talapurgue

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Echo Reporting, Inc., Transcriber Saturday, August 23, 2025

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